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Abstract 
During the last decades households in the U.S. have experienced that residential house prices 
move in a persistent manner, i.e. that returns are positively serially correlated. Since an 
owner-occupied home is usually the largest investment of a household it is important to 
understand how households act when they base their consumption and investment decisions 
on this experience. We show in a setting with housing market cycles and households who can 
decide whether they rent or own the home, that - besides the consumption and the 
precautionary savings motive - serial correlation in house prices generates a new speculative 
motive for homeownership. In particular, we show how good and bad housing market cycles 
affect homeownership rates, leverage, stock investments and consumption and can explain 
empirically observed household behavior during housing market boom and bust periods. 
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1 Introduction
The recent housing market boom and bust has drastically visualized the importance of under-
standing how households account for housing market cycles when deciding upon homeownership,
home size, leverage, stock investment, and consumption. Our paper contributes to the literature
by setting up a realistically calibrated life cycle model which accounts for housing market cycles.
That is, our model takes into account that returns in housing markets are serially correlated and
hence that housing returns can be persistently above and below their long-term average. Even
though the e￿ect of serial correlation in stock market returns has been analyzed extensively in
the literature,1 little is known about the e￿ect of housing market cycles on portfolio decisions.
This is surprising in the light of the results of the following analysis. A simple OLS regression of
annual in￿ation-adjusted house index returns rhouse (Case-Shiller Index) and in￿ation-adjusted
stock market returns rstock (S&P 500 Index) on their lagged values using data from 1954 to 2009
gives
rhouse;t =  0:0029
( 1:3757)
+ 0:8626
(18:9234)
rhouse;t 1 + house;t
rstock;t = 0:0241
(2:4776)
+ 0:0754
(1:2306)
rstock;t 1 + stock;t
where t-values are in parentheses and the R2s are 0.5330 and 0.0048, respectively. The auto-
regression parameters of 0:8626 in the regression with house index returns and of 0:0754 in case
of stock market returns shows that the empirical evidence for cycles in housing markets is much
more pronounced than the evidence in stock markets. Not to mention the statistical signi￿cance
of results which is manifested in a much higher t-value for the slope and the substantially higher
R2. Thus, as ￿rst documented empirically in Case and Shiller (1989), housing prices are subject
to market cycles. However, there is only limited research available how housing market cycles
1The literature on asset allocation decisions given predictability in stock market returns is vast compared to
their statistical signi￿cance. Given the low statistical signi￿cance, there is an intense debate on whether the
serial correlation is just spurious (Lanne (2002)) while the large string of portfolio choice literature assumes it
is given and developed a sizable number of advanced portfolio choice models to account for it. It is known, that
predictability can have a substantial e￿ect on asset allocation (Kandel and Stambaugh (1996)). In settings with
only one risky asset, Campbell (1987) and Fama and French (1989) ￿nd one-month t-bill rates and dividend
yields to forecast stock returns. Brennan et al. (1997) ￿nd mean reversion in expected returns, Ang and Bekaert
(2007) ￿nd dividend dividend yields and the short rate to predict excess returns at short horizons. Campbell
and Viceira (1999) ￿nd expected excess log returns on risky stocks to follow an AR(1) process. The results of
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) suggest that in volatile markets returns can be better predicted than in calm
markets. According to Campbell and Thompson (2008) out-of-sample predictability based on regressions can
be improved by imposing sign restrictions in accordance with economic theory. The e￿ect of predictability in
the presence of multiple risky assets is e.g. analyzed in Fluck et al. (1997), Schroder and Skiadas (1999), Lynch
(2001), Campbell et al. (2003), Schroder and Skiadas (2003), and Liu (2007). The work of Barberis (2000)
represents a compromise in the debate since it takes into account the statistical insigni￿cance by applying
Bayesian statistics. It shows that the economic signi￿cance of stock return predictability can be substantial in
portfolio decisions.
1a￿ect optimal housing, consumption, and portfolio decisions.2 In light of our simple regression
study it seems to be obvious that household decisions can be substantially in￿uenced when they
are based on the statistically valid assumption that housing markets exhibit cycles. Also the
empirical evidence of homeownership rates and leverage of U.S. households suggests that it may
be a valid assumption that households base their decisions on their experience of persistently
rising house prices and try to pro￿t from what they have learned during their life-time. According
to data from the U.S. census bureau the homeownership rate increased from 67.5% in 2001 to
68.4% in 2007 and, more striking during the same period, the average leverage of home owners
increased from 1.56 to 1.82 according to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). It is also
noteworthy that during the same period the average exposure to equity decreased from 21.6%
to 18.0% according to the SCF and the ratio of real private consumption (Datastream code
USOCFPCN) to real disposable income (Datastream code USOCFDI) increased from 93.5% to
94.5%.
The recent subprime crisis has drastically shown the importance of housing investments
since the e￿ect of continuously rising and afterwards falling house prices on household decisions
was massive. When house prices started falling, massive deleveraging took place as well as a
signi￿cant reduction of household consumption spending.3 The ratio of real private consumption
to real disposable income in the U.S. dropped from 94.5% in 2007 to 92.4% in 2009 whereas the
homeownership rate decreased from 68.4% to 67.2%.
In our study we acknowledge the fact that homeownership di￿ers from an investment in
conventional assets like, for instance, stocks or bonds. Owner-occupied homes are at the same
time both consumption and investment goods. Households both derive utility from living in a
nice home and are at the same time exposed to price changes in their homes. We follow the
usual way to model the utility derived from the housing investment, by using utility functions of
the Cobb-Douglas type.4 Flavin and Yamashita (2002) show that rental markets allow to split
the utility derived from a private home into a consumption and an investment part. Yamashita
(2003) provides empirical veri￿cation for this ￿nding. Case et al. (2005) and Campbell and
Cocco (2007) show empirically that housing investments also a￿ect households’ consumption
2Corradin et al. (2010) generalize earlier work of Damgaard et al. (2003) to a setting with housing market cycles.
However, in their model they neither include non-￿nancial labor income nor do they endogenize the decision of
whether to own or rent a home.
3The results in Amromin et al. (2010) suggest that innovative mortgages like interest only or teaser mortgages
might also have contributed to the recent boom and bust in the real estate market.
4See e.g. Damgaard et al. (2003), Cocco (2005), Yao and Zhang (2005), Li and Yao (2007), Yao and Zhang (2008),
Van Hemert (2010) or Kraft and Munk (2010).
2levels.
Trading in owner-occupied homes is subject to substantially higher transaction costs than
trading in conventional assets. To avoid these transaction costs, home owners should have a
strong locational preference for working in their region. The impact of transaction costs has
￿rst been analyzed by Grossman and Laroque (1990) for illiquid durable consumption goods.
Cauley et al. (2007) transfer their work to the housing context. Transaction costs used are around
6% (Yao and Zhang (2005) for selling) or 8% (Cocco (2005) for sales and repurchasing). The
key results from the transaction costs literature for conventional assets also apply for housing
investments. In particular, the transaction costs cause a no-trade region in which the advantage
from changing the portfolio position is outweighed by the transaction costs associated with some
such trade.5 In our model it is therefore vital to test whether the serial correlation in house prices
can be exploited by changing the homeownership status and/or the home size after accounting
for transaction costs.
Our model predicts that not only the consumption, the bu￿er-stock saving and the pre-
cautionary savings motive in￿uence household decisions but also a speculation motive. Thus,
our model shows that not only age, labor income and wealth are determinants for household
decisions but also the current state of the housing market. This result is driven by the statis-
tical signi￿cance of serial correlation as well as the size of the housing investment. Our model
proposes optimal household decisions which are commensurate to empirical household behavior.
We assume that households are dynamic expected life-time utility maximizer who account
for a risky house price process with mean-reverting drift term, risky labor income, and risky
stock markets to decide upon owning or renting a home, the home size, the investment ratios,
as well as consumption of a non-durable good. We calibrate the house price process in the way
that the drift term is an a￿ne function of the past annual house price return. Hence if the
house price return is above (below) average it is likely that the next year return will be above
(below) average too, hence this de￿nes a good (bad) housing market cycle, respectively. Given
the regression above it is no surprise that the estimated parameters are highly signi￿cant. Our
model predicts that the half-life of housing market cycles is roughly 4.5 years. This indicates
that cycles are long enough to react and change the homeownership status or the home size even
if moving cost are 8% for owners and 1% for renters.
5See e.g. Constantinides (1986), Davis and Norman (1990), Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Lynch and Balduzzi
(2000), Leland (2001), Muthuraman and Kulmar (2006) and Lynch and Tan (2009).
3In good cycles our model predicts increases in homeownership rate, home size, and leverage.
In order to ￿nance the home and to pro￿t from the high expected house price appreciation, the
household reduces instantaneously consumption rates and the proportion of stocks, implying a
substitution e￿ect in terms of favoring housing consumption over non-durable good consump-
tion, and housing investment over stock market investment. In the long-run, however, the wealth
e￿ect dominates the substitution e￿ect since the household accumulates in expectation a sizable
amount of wealth due to the leveraged housing investment so that the absolute levels of con-
sumption as well as stock market investments are increasing. Even when the expected house
appreciation is not pronounced enough to increase the size of an owned home, the model predicts
that households increase consumption rates and stock investments due to the expected wealth
increase.
In bad states of the housing market cycle, such as the current housing market crisis, our
model predicts decreasing homeownership rates, housing investments, and leverage ratios. While
instantaneously consumption ratios and stock ratios are increasing due to the substitution e￿ect,
the wealth e￿ect leads to a reduction of consumption levels and stock market investments within
short time. Simulations show that given the persistence of house price returns and the pro-
cyclical behavior of households, it is likely that it takes years to recover from a housing market
crisis. It is noteworthy that the household only sells a home if the expected house price slump is
signi￿cant. The reason is that for mild slumps transaction costs outweigh the bene￿ts of selling
the home so that the household optimally decides to keep the home and to persevere the housing
bust until it is over.
Our welfare analysis shows that the welfare losses of both erroneously assuming serial corre-
lation when house price returns are i.i.d. and assuming i.i.d. returns when house price returns
are serially correlated, are seizable and heavily driven by the risk of losses in leveraged housing
investments. This risk is especially pronounced for younger investors that are endowed with
lower levels of ￿nancial wealth. Welfare losses from ignoring existing cycles tend to outweigh
welfare costs from erroneously assuming non-existing cycles.
Further, our model predicts homeownership rates which come close to empirical patterns
in the U.S. while earlier studies like Yao and Zhang (2005) predicted rates of 100% for large
parts of the household’s life cycle. In our base-case parameter setting, the homeownership rate
is around 80%. When we account for higher correlation between house price and labor income
risk the homeownership rate is at around 70% which comes very close to the homeownership
4rate of 67.2% reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for 2009.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model and the household’s
optimization problem. In Section 3, we discuss the e￿ect of housing market cycles on life cycle
consumption, housing, and portfolio decisions by presenting numerical results and performing
an impulse-response Monte Carlo analysis that highlights the long-run e￿ects of housing market
booms and busts on housing, consumption and investment decisions. The section also provides a
welfare analysis in order to test the economic as opposed to the statistical signi￿cance of housing
market cycles. Section 4 checks the robustness of our results and is followed by a conclusion in
Section 5.
2 The Household Decision Problem with Housing Market Cycles
2.1 Preferences
We employ a continuous time model, where t determines the household’s adult age (computed
as actual age minus 20) and T denotes the end of the household’s life cycle. Household’s utility
at each point in time is characterized through a Cobb-Douglas utility function u de￿ned over
consumption and housing:
u(C;Q) =
(C1  Q )1 

1   

; (1)
where, C is the amount the household consumes of a non-durable good, Q is the size of the
home the household lives in, 
 is the coe￿cient of relative risk aversion and   is the relative
preference over housing consumption. The household’s time-separable additive utility function
U is given by
U =
Z T
0
 tu(Ct;Qt)dt; (2)
with  determining the subjective discount rate. The household’s lifespan is modeled from age
20 (t = 0) to 80 (t = T = 60) and retirement begins at age 65 (tretire = 45). As a result, the
working life is 45 years long while the length of the retirement phase is 15 years. Preference
parameters are set to values standard in the life cycle literature, including a coe￿cient of relative
risk aversion of 
 = 10 as in Cocco et al. (2005) and a utility discount factor of 1= = 0:96. The
housing preference is set to   = 0:2 as in Yao and Zhang (2005) and consistent with the average
proportion of household housing expenditure in the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
52.2 Housing Markets
The household’s investment opportunity is comprised of a housing, a stock, and a bond market.
The housing and the stock market are assumed to be risky while the bond market is risk-free.
House price and stock market risk can be correlated, re￿ecting that both tend to depend on a
common risk factor, like for instance the macroeconomic state of the economy.
The price of one housing unit Q = 1 is assumed to evolve according to
dH=H =
 
r +  H + H;t

dt + H dZH;
H;t = 
 
t    
 (3)
where  H denotes the long-term average risk premium and H;t denotes the cyclical risk pre-
mium. The cyclical risk premium is by de￿nition time-varying with mean zero. The time-varying
cyclical risk premium allows us to model cycles exhibiting above average and below average house
price returns. Therefore,  > 0 determines the sensitivity to the di￿erence of a predictive signal
t minus its long term average  . H is the instantaneous volatility of house price changes, and
dZH is the increment of a Brownian motion.
In what follows, we employ the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process to model the predictive signal
dynamics since we aim to model stationary cycles:
d = 
     

dt +  dZ; (4)
where  > 0 determines the speed of mean reversion,   is the long-run expected signal lim
t!1
E(t),
and  is the instantaneous volatility of the expected risk premium. The expected future signal
is E(t+tjt) =   + (t    )e t, its variance is Var (t+t) =
2

2
 
1   e 2t
. If the current
signal realization is above the long-term average (t >  ) the expected future signal is also above
average (E(t+tj) >  ) since e t > 0, and vice versa. The correlation between the predictive
signal shocks and the house price shocks is de￿ned by dZ dZH = H dt.
6The expected log-return and variance of house prices are given by
E[ln(Ht+t=Ht)] = (r +  H   1=22
H + H;t)t=
 
1   e t
(5)
Var[ln(Ht+t=Ht)] =
 
2
H +
22

2 + 2
HH

!
t
 2
 
22

3 +
HH
2
!
 
1   e t
+
22

23
 
1   e 2t
: (6)
The current level of the predictive signal t is a state variable which in￿uences utility from
taking house price risk by investing in house equity as opposed to investing in stocks or bonds.
Further, it determines the motivation to defer consumption because consuming now by renting a
big home or by consuming the non-durable good is costly if the housing market is in a relatively
good state H;t > 0.
To estimate the house price process we use annual real U.S. home price from 1953 to 2009
(N = 56 years). Figure 1 shows the evolution of U.S. home and stock prices based on data from
Robert Shiller’s website.6
Please insert Figure 1 about here.
The nominal home price time series is constructed of PHCPI data from from 1953 to 1974,
OFHEO data from 1975 to 1986, and the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index from 1987 to 2009.
The house prices are de￿ated using the U.S. CPI data provided by Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Especially the lower graph, depicting the evolution of the house price index, highlights the high
level of serial correlation.
To estimate the signal process, we assume that the predictive signal is given by the real
annual house index return of the preceding year. The intuition is that if the preceding return in
t   1 is above (below) the average   return, the cyclical housing risk premium H;t is positive,
indicating a good state of the housing market (negative, indicating a bad cycle of the housing
market). Regressing annual real log-housing returns on preceding real log-housing returns allows
us to estimate the required parameters and their standard errors. Our results are summarized
in Table 1.
Please insert Table 1 about here.
The empirical long-term housing risk premium is  H =  1:68% and the house price index
volatility is H = 3:74%. Price changes of individual homes are far from perfectly correlated,
6http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/.
7the aggregation in the house price index therefore reduces house price volatility. Case and
Shiller (1989) argue that the volatility of individual house prices is close to 15%. We follow
this estimate and set H = 13:32%, which, together with the volatility of the house price signal
implies a volatility of the log-house prices of 15% as in Van Hemert (2010). The estimated auto-
regressive coe￿cient is  = 0:8567, indicating a strong dependence to the past annual return.
Since the standard error of  is 0:1034 the serial dependency is statistically signi￿cant.
The unconditional average log-return is   = 0:22% and the volatility of the predictive signal
is  = 4:054%. The estimated mean reversion speed is  = 0:1478. This parameter determines
the degree of persistence of housing market cycles. The di￿erence t   is in expectation reduced
by the factor e t < 1 from t to t + t. Hence the expected half-life thalf of the di￿erence is
derived from e thalf = 0:5 , thalf =  ln0:5=. Hence,  = 0:1478 indicates that the half-life
of housing market cycles is thalf = 4:7 years. The higher , the shorter are housing market
cycles in expectation. The half-life of housing market cycles determines whether households can
bene￿t from anticipating future house price returns, especially due to the presence of substantial
transaction costs. Since a shorter half-life will reduce the bene￿ts of predictability, we check in
a robustness analysis how an increase of  by one standard deviation changes our results.
The value of a home with a certain size Q is Q  H. Households can rent or own the house
they live in. Renters pay continuously renting costs mrentQH dt with mrent denoting the rate of
renting costs. Owners pay maintenance costs mownQH dt where mown is the rate of maintenance
costs. If the owner is not maintaining the home, the maintenance expenses can be interpreted
as depreciation costs. Finally, the rate of running housing costs m can be expressed as
m(Iown) = mrent(1   Iown) + mownIown; (7)
where Iown = 1 if the household owns the home and Iown = 0 if the household rents the home.
Non-recurring housing expenses  are realized if the household changes the ownership status
Iown
t+ 6= Iown
t where t+ denotes one logical moment after t. If the household becomes a new owner
(renter) transaction costs are own  Qt+  Ht or rent  Qt+  Ht where own (rent) denotes the
percentage cost of becoming an owner (renter) and Qt+ is the size of the new home. Transaction
costs are also incurred if the household remains a renter Iown
t+ = Iown
t = 0 or owner Iown
t+ =
Iown
t = 1 in case she changes the home size, i.e. Qt+ 6= Qt. Transaction costs can be summarized
8as follows
(Qt+;Iown
t+ ;Iown
t ) = Qt+Ht
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
own , if new owner((Iown
t+   Iown
t ) = 1)
rent , if new renter((Iown
t+   Iown
t ) =  1)
own , if owner changes home size (Iown
t+ = Iown
t = 1;Qt+ 6= Qt)
rent , if renter changes home size (Iown
t+ = Iown
t = 0;Qt+ 6= Qt)
0 , if household stays in home (Iown
t+ = Iown
t ;Qt+ = Qt):
(8)
We set the minimum equity requirement for a home purchase to Emin = 20% as in Yao and
Zhang (2005) and Van Hemert (2010). The renting costs rate and the maintenance costs rates
are set to mrent = 7% and mown = 1:5%, respectively. Moving costs for households moving to
an owner-occupied or a rented home are set to own = 8:0% and rent = 1:0% as in Cocco (2005)
and Van Hemert (2010), respectively.
2.3 Capital Markets
The representative stock market index is assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion
dS=S = (r + S)dt + S dZS; (9)
where r denotes the risk-free interest rate, S represents the long-run expected risk premium,
S the instantaneous volatility of stock price changes, and dZS is the increment of a Brownian
motion. Bond prices evolve according to
dB=B = rdt:7 (10)
The equity risk premium is set to S = 4% and volatility at S = 16%. These values
are in line with recent studies including e.g. Claus and Thomas (2001), Cocco et al. (2005) or
Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and acknowledge the view that future expected stock returns
should be below its historical average. We set correlations between stock returns and house
price risk as well as house price risk and the signal to their empirical estimates of SH = 0:22
and H = 0:9967, respectively. The correlation between stocks returns and the predictive signal
7In order to keep the model parsimonious we assume that the interest rate of the bond as well as for the mortgage
is the same.
9shocks is set to S to 0.22. The risk-free interest rate is set to r = ln(1 + 2%).
2.4 Labor Income
Several studies have recently highlighted the importance of including labor income as a non-
tradable asset in portfolio choice frameworks (e.g. Bodie et al. (1992), Viceira (2001), or Cocco
et al. (2005)). The drop in labor income at retirement creates a precautionary savings motive.
Further, labor income risk is shown to create demand for bu￿er stock saving early in life. Since
labor income is a regular stream of positive cash ￿ows it can be viewed as a coupon bearing
bond with stochastic coupon payments. Hence, households with labor income will hold a high
proportion of stock investments when they are young and shift stocks to bonds while they get
older and their human capital shrinks to 0.
Further, the riskiness of labor income is an important factor when a household decides about
buying or renting a home because the household might be forced to sell its home due to falling
labor income. Including stochastic income into our analysis is also important to understand the
drawbacks of the in￿exibility created by homeownership due to transaction costs. We assume
that the household earns unspanned labor income L which is subject to permanent shocks during
worklife and constant afterwards. So we have
dL=L =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
g(t)dt + L dZL , during worklife t < tretire
 (1   Rretire) , entering retirement t = tretire
0 , during retirement t > tretire
(11)
where tretire is the age the household enters her retirement phase, and g(t) = b + 2c(t + 20) +
3d(t + 20)2 is the age-dependent expected real income growth rate as in Van Hemert (2010).
L re￿ects the level of income risk, and dZL is the increment of a Brownian motion. Rretire is
the replacement ratio which is de￿ned as ￿rst pension income divided by last labor income. We
set the correlation between stocks and labor income to SL = 0:2 as in Cocco (2005), re￿ecting
the generally low correlation between the stock and the labor market, which essentially makes
labor income risk unspanned risk. Correlation between house price and labor income shocks is
set to HL = 0:2 as in Yao and Zhang (2005). The correlation between labor income and the
predictive signal is also set to L = 0:2.
Parameter values of labor and pension income processes are set in accordance with Cocco
10et al. (2005); our base case sets the parameters of the deterministic labor income drift g(t) and
volatility parameters for permanent labor income shocks during working life to represent U.S.
households with high school education (b = 0:1682, c =  0:00323, d = 0:00002, L = 0:1) as
in Van Hemert (2010). The labor income pro￿le exhibits a hump-shape with expected rising
income until age 45 and declining income thereafter. When entering retirement, households
receive a constant pension income amounting to Rretire = 70% of the last realized labor income,
that is to account for social security bene￿ts. We summarize our choice of base case parameters
in Table 2.
Please insert Table 2 about here.
2.5 The Household’s Optimization Problem
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility by deciding at each point in time t 2 [0;T]
upon consumption of the non-durable good C, the home size Q, the ownership status Iown, the
stock fraction ws, and the bond fraction b. Hence, the indirect value function V is given by
V (q;i;;l;w;h;t) = sup
fCs;Qs;Iown
s ;s
s;b
sgT
s=t
E
hZ T
t
s tu(Cs;Qs)ds
 

Qt = q;Iown
t = i;t = ;Lt = l;Wt = w;Ht = h
i
;
(12)
where W denotes the households total wealth, s and b are the fractions of total wealth held
in stocks and bonds, respectively. The indirect utility function is given by
V (q;i;;l;w;h;t) = sup
fCt;Qt;Iown
t ;s
t;b
tg
u(Ct;Qt)t
+ tE
h
V (Qt+t;Iown
t+t;t+t;Lt+t;Wt+t;Ht+t;t + t)

 
Qt = q;Iown
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The household’s total wealth W is
W = WF + WH; (14)
where WH = Iown QH denotes the housing wealth and WF = W(s + b) is the household’s
￿nancial wealth with s and b re￿ecting the proportions of total wealth held in stocks and
bonds, respectively.
11The household’s intertemporal budget restriction is given by
dWF = sW
dS
S
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+ (L   C)dt
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t )
 m(Iown)HQdt
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t Qt): (15)
Further, we impose the restriction that the household cannot short stocks (s  0) while bonds
can only be shorted in order to ￿nance the ownership of a home. The minimum equity require-
ment when owning a home is given by Emin > 0 so that the amount of debt  bW has to
obey
  b W  (1   Emin)IownH Q: (16)
The state space of the optimization problem is reduced by two dimensions by exploiting the ho-
mogeneity of the time-separable Cobb- Douglas utility function in C and Q so that the following
equivalent optimization problem holds
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where ct = Ct=Wt is the consumption rate and qt = Qt=Wt is the household’s normalized home
size where we have normalized Ht to 1.8 So, the policy functions c;q;I;s;b and the value
function  depend on ￿ve state variables: 1) the normalized size of the home wH =
H Q
W , the
household lives in, 2) the ownership status I, 3) the predictive signal , 4) the labor income-
wealth ratio lw = L
W , and 5) time t.
8Due to this normalization, the terms normalized home size and house value can be used interchangeably.
123 Optimal Household Decisions in the Presence of housing mar-
ket Cycles
3.1 Optimal policy functions
We compute the optimal policy functions consumption rate c(:), normalized home size q(:),
homeownership status I(:), stock fraction s(:), bond fraction b(:) numerically by backward in-
duction in the discretized ￿ve-dimensional state-space. We discretize continuous state-variables:
normalized value of the home wH =
H Q
W , the housing market signal , the labor income-wealth
ratio lw = L
W , and time t. The time-step is one year. The only discrete state variable is the
homeownership status s (we set s = 1 for owners and s = 0 for renters).
In what follows, we discuss the numerically computed optimal policies and show how housing
market cycles a￿ect not only rational housing decisions but also consumption behavior as well
as investments in stocks and bonds. The graphs in Figure 2 show the optimal policy functions
for households aged 35 who have been renting their home previously and are endowed with a
labor income-wealth ratio of lw = 0:23.9
The consumption rate c and the normalized home size q as well as the equity and bond
exposure are reported in relation to the household’s wealth level before trading, i.e. before
deducting potential transaction costs.
In order to show how household behavior is a￿ected by the housing market cycle, we show
the optimal policy as a function of the cyclical housing risk premium H;t and the normalized
home size before trading wH.
Please insert Figure 2 about here.
The surfaces with thick (thin) lines indicate the states in which the household decides to rent
(own) the home, respectively. The upper left graph of Figure 2 shows that a renter decides
to stay renter only if the cyclical housing risk premium is signi￿cantly negative and decide to
assume ownership if it is positive and even when it is slightly negative.
Case 1: renter stays renter. If the cyclical housing risk premium is signi￿cantly negative, a
renter decides to stay a renter. In such a bad housing market state, the renter anticipates falling
house prices so that he is less inclined to postpone consumption into the future. The household
does also not need to build up the minimum equity required to buy a home in the near future
9This value corresponds to the average labor income-wealth ratio at age 35 from 10,000 simulations on the optimal
paths.
13because the persistence of the housing market cycle makes it a bad investment for a couple of
years. As such, the graph shows that households increase the consumption of the non-durable
good and the consumption of the home. That is the renter prefers to rent a larger home instead
of buying one.
Since we assume a positive correlation (L = 0:2) between shocks in the cyclical housing
risk premium and labor income shocks, it is likely that housing market slumps and labor market
slumps (decreases in  and decreases in L) occur simultaneously. In these situations the increas-
ing normalized home size and consumption ratio stabilize absolute consumption levels. It also
becomes apparent that previous renters decide to stay in their home if the previous home size is
close enough to the optimal one. In these situations the renter decides to avoid transaction costs
since the implied cost of a suboptimal home size is smaller. Further, the renter can compensate
a smaller or larger home with higher or smaller consumption ratios. Finally, the renter will have
a diversi￿ed ￿nancial portfolio between stocks and bonds.
Case 2: renter stays renter. For high housing risk premiums a previous renter decides to
become an owner. Hence, this result shows that housing market cycles have a strong impact on
the homeownership decision of households whereas models assuming i.i.d. house price returns
like e.g. Yao and Zhang (2005) report homeownership rates of 100% over large parts of the
household’s life cycle. Our result is a direct consequence of the strong degree of serial correlation
in housing returns and its statistical signi￿cance. Further, this result can also be documented
empirically with an OLS regression of annual U.S. homeownership rates Rown;t from the U.S.
Census Bureau on past annual Case-Shiller Index returns rhouse;t 1 using data from 1968 to 2009
yields the equation (t-values in parentheses):
Rown;t = 0:6472
(844:0964)
+ 0:1121
(18:3045)
rhouse;t 1 + t: (17)
The R2 for this regression is 0.5868.
The bought home size increases substantially with the cyclical housing risk premium since
households decide to leverage the risk premium in order to accumulate wealth. In case the
premium is at around 20%, the purchased home is more than two times larger then the rented
home in states with negative cyclical housing risk premium. The home is ￿nanced by a mortgage
which has to be paid for with a reduction in the consumption rate by about two to three
percentage points. In turn, the higher the cyclical housing risk premium the higher is the
14willingness to postpone consumption and to substitute the non-durable good with a large owned
home. It also becomes apparent that the higher the cyclical housing risk premium is, the lower
is the optimal equity exposure. While it is around 40% for low cyclical housing risk premiums
it decreases to 0% for very high premiums. The reason for this ￿nding is that the speculative
demand for stocks is crowded out by the demand for house property. This important result
might contribute to the literature seeking to explain the puzzling empirical evidence of low
equity exposures and low stock market participation rates (Koyotaki et al. (2008)).
Please insert Figure 3 about here.
Case 3: Owner stays owner. Figure 3 focuses on the optimal behavior of a household which
so far has owned its home. Such an owner has three options: 1) to stay in his home, 2) to
stay owner, but to change the home size, and 3) to become a renter. This ￿exibility is a￿ected
substantially by transaction costs for owners that are so high that it is for many states optimal to
stay in the same home even if the optimal home size (in the absence of transaction costs) would
be substantially di￿erent. The ￿gure makes apparent that it is likely that the owner decides to
stay in the same home unless the housing risk premium is very low. In case the retained home
size is somewhat too small, the household compensates the lack of present utility with higher
consumption ratios and the forgone cyclical housing risk premium with higher equity exposures.
If the home size is actually too large, the opposite is true so that the household might reduce
consumption rates to low levels in order to stay in the same home.
Case 4: Owner becomes renter. The main reason for being forced to abandon and owned
home is when the cyclical housing risk premium is very small so that the home owner expects a
deep housing market slump. This decision is not only triggered by the short term expectation
but also the medium term expectation since the half-life of cycles is expected to be 4.7 years. In
case of a moderate housing market slump (i.e. slightly negative expected cyclical risk premium)
the owner stays in its home and tolerates expected declines in housing wealth for some years
since incurring the transaction costs would be even worse. This is especially true if the housing
wealth is relatively low. If housing wealth has already been above its desired level, the owner
is more inclined to sell its home since he cannot tolerate to experience a housing market slump
with a highly leveraged housing investment.
153.2 Monte Carlo Simulation of a Complete Life Cycle
This section discusses how housing market cycles a￿ect the expected evolution of consumption,
investments and the household’s wealth level over the life cycle. We conduct a Monte Carlo
simulation to obtain 10,000 paths for optimal consumption, housing and investment strategies.
Please insert Figure 4 about here.
In Figure 4 we plot the evolution of the household’s average total wealth, housing wealth, stock
investments, and bond/mortgage holdings for our base case parameter setting as a multiple of
the initial labor income at age 20. The household’s initial wealth level at age 20 is set to 1, i.e.
the household is just endowed with the initial labor income.
In line with recent work by e.g. Cocco et al. (2005), it indicates the precautionary savings
motive of households anticipating the drop in income by 30% when entering retirement. Hence
households build up wealth until retirement by investing in stocks, bonds, and residential prop-
erty. The amount of housing wealth dominates total wealth up to age 45. Only after that age
￿nancial wealth makes up more than 50% of total wealth. The rational is that households have
a precautionary motive of buying a larger home at young age which will be su￿ciently large to
stay in for a long time so that moving costs are avoided.
Please insert Figure 5 about here.
Figure 5 depicts separately for owners and renters the evolution of the consumption rate c,
the normalized home size q, the equity exposure, the exposure to bonds and mortgages (bond
exposure), as well as the homeownership rate over the life cycle.
In general, the ￿gure indicates that renters tend to consume a higher fraction of their wealth,
tend to hold more equity, and tend to investment more heavily in bonds. These results are driven
by the presence of housing market cycles and the borrowing constraint the household faces. At
young age, the household is endowed with low ￿nancial wealth but high human capital from
future labor income. For purchasing a home, however, he can only borrow against ￿nancial
wealth, but not against his human capital. He therefore cannot a￿ord to buy a home that is
likely to still meet his requirements a few years ahead in time. Unless such an household faces
a very attractive cyclical housing risk premium, he therefore remains a renter.
From the household’s prime earning years on, this result reverses. Households already have
accumulated signi￿cant ￿nancial wealth. For not sharply decreasing their ￿nancial wealth by
16substantial lease payments, renters optimally choose to live in smaller homes. Owners, at this
age, however, on average live in slightly larger homes than renters. In addition to utility from
the property of the home as a durable consumption good, these households seek to also bene￿t
from the home as an investment good. Especially in states with desirable cyclical housing risk
premiums, the home’s investment character increases in relevance, causing the household to
invest a larger fraction of his wealth into its home.
A renter, however, does not bene￿t from increases in house prices and only bene￿ts from
the characteristics of the home as a durable consumption good. Consequently, this household
does not have an incentive to speculate on desirable future housing returns and therefore, on
average, chooses a slightly lower home size. Our results con￿rm the ￿nding of Pellizon and
Weber (2009) that older households tend to be overexposed to housing investments. To avoid
moving costs, older households have to debt-￿nance their housing investments again ￿ a pattern
which somewhat resembles a reverse mortgage. However, in contrast to a true reverse mortgage
contract, in our setting the household still bears the house price risk.
We observe, that renters have higher consumption rates than owners during their working
life. At young age this is due to the fact that young households buying a home are usually
borrowing constrained and therefore cannot a￿ord a higher consumption level. During the
household’s prime earning years, this is due to the fact that owners usually choose larger home
sizes. Since consumption and the size of the home the household lives in are substitutes, the
household partly substitutes consumption with a larger home.
The exposure to equity is systematically lower for owners than for renters. As already
mentioned in Hu (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005) this is caused by a substitution e￿ect. Given
that both housing and stock investments are risky, renters not investing into housing substitute
for this by investing more heavily into stocks. For both owners and renters, we observe a
signi￿cant increase in the optimal equity exposure when attaining retirement age. Again, this
increase is due to the fact that in contrast to labor income, social security bene￿ts are no
longer subject to shocks. While during working age, correlation between labor income and the
return on equity is positive, social security bene￿ts and the return on equity are uncorrelated.
This decrease in correlation increases the desirability of holding equity and therefore causes the
household to increase his equity exposure.
The exposure to bonds di￿ers remarkably for owners and renters. Given that only home
owners can use their homes as collaterals, this is not surprising. We observe that home owners
17on average choose substantial leverages at young age whereas they on average manage to pay
their debt o￿ during their prime earning years. During retirement, however, home owners tend
to increase their debt again. This is due to the fact that during retirement households run down
their wealth quickly, as already seen in Figure 4, implying that the fraction of wealth held in
the home is increasing.
3.3 The Short and Long-run E￿ects of Housing Market Cycles
Having studied the e￿ect of housing market cycles on the evolution of consumption, portfolio
choice and housing decisions over the life cycle, we now turn to illustrating how external shocks
in housing market cycles a￿ect consumption, housing and investment decisions as well as home-
ownership rates over the life cycle. In order to do so, we perform an impulse response analysis
and shock the cyclical housing risk premium in all of the 10,000 simulated paths at age 30. 10 In
particular, we show that our model is able to predict short and long-run household behavior in
terms of homeownership rates, equity exposures, leverages and consumption levels during and
after housing market booms as well as busts.
3.3.1 Housing Market Boom
We begin our impulse response analysis by considering a positive shock in the cyclical housing
risk premium H by 8.6 percentage points, which represents a housing market boom. Shocking
the H-value allows us to study how housing market booms a￿ect consumption, portfolio and
housing decisions and whether these e￿ect are wiped out within few periods or have long-run
e￿ects. Figure 6 shows the evolution of average real consumption, home size, equity and bond
holdings as well as the homeownership rate and the evolution of housing wealth. To assess
whether owners or renters might react to a housing market boom in a di￿erent manner, we
report separately results for households that are owners and renters before trading at age 30.
Please insert Figure 6 about here.
In line with empirical evidence, our model predicts an increase in the homeownership rate
caused by the housing market boom. Despite the mean reverting property of the housing market
cycle, our results clearly indicate that a housing market boom positively a￿ects homeownership
rates over a longer time horizon, which is mainly caused by two e￿ects. First, the half-life of the
10We also computed results for shocks at other ages. Given that these results did not di￿er qualitatively from
those we obtained when shocking at the age of 30, we do not report them here in detail.
18housing market cycle is relatively long. Secondly, even if the housing market boom is over and
the housing risk premium has reverted to its mean, the household may still be a home owner
and has an incentive not to sell his home to avoid transaction costs.
Also in line with empirical data, a housing market boom results in an increase in the value
of the home the household lives in and substantially increases his housing wealth. In particular,
households that have previously been renters invest in housing to also bene￿t from the housing
market boom. Furthermore, for households facing a housing market boom, housing wealth is
growing at a faster rate over the next periods due to the long half-life of the housing market
cycle.
At the same time, housing market booms a￿ect consumption and investment strategies. As
an immediate reaction to the housing market boom, both owners and renters are subject to a
substitution e￿ect. In order to ￿nance large homes, they reduce their consumption. Within a
few periods, however, these households on average consume more than households that have not
experienced a housing market boom, a pattern which re￿ects the wealth e￿ect resulting from
the housing market boom. Similar e￿ects can be observed for the equity and bond holdings.
In line with empirical evidence from the SCF, which indicates that the average fraction of
wealth held in equity has been decreasing from 21.6% in 2001 to 18.0% in 2007, our model
predicts that equity is substituted with housing investments. In the long-run, however, the
increasing housing wealth leads to an increase in absolute equity holdings.
3.3.2 Housing Market Bust
We next turn to studying how housing market busts a￿ect consumption, housing and investment
decisions over the life cycle. To do so, we consider a negative shock in the cyclical housing risk
premium by -8.6 percentage points.
Please insert Figure 7 about here.
Our results in Figure 7 show that many results we saw in Figure 6 with a housing market boom
are reversed when we consider a housing market bust. In line with empirical evidence, our model
predicts a decline in the homeownership rate. Due to the long half-life of the housing market
cycle and the transaction costs involved with transacting a home, the e￿ect of a housing market
bust a￿ects homeownership rates over several decades.
19A decrease in the homeownership rate as a fraction to bad housing market cycles is also
found empirically. According to data from the U.S. census bureau, the homeownership rate
decreased from 68.4% in 2007 to 67.2% in 2009. In general, home owners optimally decrease
their housing wealth and deleverage their balance sheets. Due to the drop in wealth caused by
the housing market busts, households have lower housing wealth and live in smaller homes over
their entire life cycle. Households that are renters before trading at age 30, however, can even
increase the size of the home due to the expected future decrease in their rents. At the same
time, they increase their consumption level, re￿ecting the close relation between optimal housing
and consumption policies. The increase in both the size of the home and the consumption level
is caused by the falling rents and the less desirable investment opportunity set the household is
facing. Within a few periods, however, the wealth e￿ect dominates consumption and housing
decisions and implies that both initial owners and renter are restricted to smaller homes and the
empirically observed lower consumption level.
Our model predicts that as an immediate reaction to the housing market bust, both owners
and renters increase their equity holdings. Similarly they reduce their leverage by reducing
their mortgages and/or increasing their bond holdings. That is, households substitute housing
wealth with equity and bonds. In the long-run, the wealth e￿ect also dominates equity and bond
holdings and implies that households that have experienced the housing market bust hold less
equity and bonds.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
In order to assess the welfare implications of housing market cycles over the life cycle, it is helpful
to compare our base-case setting with a case exhibiting i.i.d. house price returns. Assuming i.i.d.
returns implies that households do not base their decisions on the current state of the housing
market. In order to equalize the ￿rst two moments of the housing return distribution we set the
i.i.d. case parameters to H = 15% and  = 0.
Please insert Figure 8 about here.
Figure 8 compares the evolution of absolute real levels of consumption, home value, equity and
bond holdings and housing wealth as well as the homeownership rate in a world with market
cycles (solid lines) with results in a world without market cycles (dotted lines).
20In order to partly separate the consumption and investment components of privately owned
homes, we di￿erentiate between home size, which measures the size of the home the household
lives in, and housing wealth, which is the amount of wealth an owner has invested in his home.
Housing wealth is zero for renters that do not purchase a home, whereas the home size always
takes on a positive value. Home size is therefore a better proxy for the home as a durable
consumption good, whereas housing wealth better proxies for the investment character.
In the absence of housing market cycles the homeownership rate is close to 100% for large
parts of the investor’s life cycle, much higher than in the base-case where around 80% of the
10,000 households own a home. The reason is that in the i.i.d. case the expected risk premium
is constant which increases the desirability of housing investments because the i.i.d. case does
not capture the risks of a persistently adverse housing market cycle.
Another striking e￿ect of housing market cycles is that households on average manage to
attain higher consumption levels and live in larger homes by exploiting these cycles, which
accumulates in a signi￿cant wealth e￿ect over the life cycle. This wealth e￿ect also translates
into higher equity and bond holdings in the setting with housing market cycles.
Given the the expected wealth and consumption levels in the case with cycles it is obvious
that households can exploit the serial correlation bene￿cially for their welfare. However, this
welfare increase is based on the assumption that housing market cycles exist. Despite the fact
that the statistical signi￿cance for housing market cycles in the past is overwhelming, there
remains a possibility that they will no longer exist in the future.
In the following, we investigate the welfare costs of two types of errors. First, we consider the
type I error (wrong rejection of the null hypothesis that returns are predictable) where welfare
loss are generated by ignoring existing cycles. Secondly, we study the type II error (fail to
reject wrong null hypothesis) where welfare losses occur since households assume cycles when
they actually do not exist. The type I error allows us to access the importance of integrating
housing market cycles into life cycle housing, consumption and portfolio planning. The type II
error allows us to assess welfare implications if housing markets would no longer be subject to
cycles in the future. Welfare costs are computed in two steps. First, we compute welfare levels
for each and every state in our grid when following the respective suboptimal policy. We then
compare attainable certainty equivalent wealth level of the optimal and the respective suboptimal
strategies with each other to compute welfare costs from suboptimal trading. Welfare costs are
measured in percentage of present ￿nancial, housing and human wealth (future labor income),
21the investor is willing to give up to avoid having to trade under the respective suboptimal
strategy that either erroneously ignores existing housing market cycles or falsely assumes the
existence of non-existing cycles. That is, welfare costs can also be interpreted as percentage
permanent decreases in consumption and home size the investor is willing to give up to avoid
having to trade under a suboptimal strategy.
Please insert Figure 9 about here.
Figure 9 depicts the average expected welfare costs over the life cycle from 10,000 simulations
on the respective optimal paths. For each path, the initial value for the cyclical housing risk
premium is drawn from its stationary distribution. Our results show that welfare costs from
ignoring existing cycles are substantial. First, households ignoring existing cycles (dashed line)
fail to exploit housing market booms by not increasing their home size to bene￿t from increasing
house prices. Secondly, households underestimate the risk of persistent bad housing market
cycles so that they keep their homes during housing market slumps. This risk is especially
pronounced for younger households with lower wealth levels that ￿nance their homes with high
leverage ratios and run the risk of experiencing large losses when ignoring housing market cycles.
Thirdly, not adjusting the home size to circumstances implies second-order e￿ects via the choice
of suboptimal consumption, equity and bond policies. These welfare e￿ects are partly o￿set by
the lower trading frequency of the home and the thereby saved transaction costs.
The welfare loss of households assuming housing market cycles when they do not exist are
shown in the solid line. Such a household uses signals that do not contain any information to
predict housing returns and act as if these signals would contain information about the cyclical
housing risk premium. Therefore, the household might falsely sell (buy) a home because it
assumes that the bad (good) housing market cycle is persistent, assuming the half-life of cycles
of 4.7 years estimated above. Hence welfare losses are generated since the household incurs
avoidable moving costs and is exposed to too much house price risk when it predicts a good
cycle and too less house price risk when it predicts a bad cycle. In particular, this household
also faces an increased risk of higher losses from leveraged housing investments. In addition, our
results in Figures 2 and 3 show, that consumption, equity and bond policies are also a￿ected,
which results in additional welfare e￿ects. Taken together, these e￿ects result in the depicted
welfare costs.
22In total, our results show that ignoring housing market cycles in life cycle consumption,
housing, and portfolio decisions results in seizable welfare costs and tend to exceed welfare costs
from erroneously assuming non-existing cycles. It seems likely that households consider the
state of the housing market in their decisions. Two reasons speak for this. First, households
have experienced the statistically signi￿cant serial correlation in housing returns and secondly,
welfare losses are too large to be ignored.
4 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we study how optimal policies are a￿ected by changes in parameter assumptions.
We will focus on three settings.11 First, we study a setting, where we increase the correla-
tion between housing and stock market risk to SH = 0:5. This allows us to investigate how
consumption, housing and portfolio policies are a￿ected by decreased diversi￿cation potential.
Secondly, we study a scenario, where we increase the correlation between housing and labor
income risk to HL = 0:5, an order of magnitude which can be found in local housing markets
(Davido￿ (2006)). Thirdly, we investigate a scenario in which we set , our mean-reversion pa-
rameter in the house price process to the sum of its estimated value and its estimated standard
deviation, i.e.  = 0:2922. This decreases the half-life of shocks in the housing market to about
2.4 years, thereby allowing us to assess the importance of the duration of housing markets cycles
for optimal consumption, housing and investment strategies over the life cycle.
Table 3 shows averages and standard deviations for the household’s consumption rate c
(consumption), the normalized home size q as well as the fraction of wealth invested held in
stocks (equity exposure) and bonds (bond exposure). It further shows homeownership rates.
All results are based on 10,000 simulations on the respective optimal paths. Results are shown
separately for owners and renters.
Please insert Table 3 about here.
Our results show that an increase in correlation between changes in stock and house prices
(SH = 0:5) decreases the average home size for owners, decreases the homeownership rate and
increases the owners’ equity exposure compared to our base case parameter setting. Owners’
consumption policies and bond exposures, on the other hand, are not much a￿ected.
11Besides the results reported here, we, among others, also studied settings in which we introduced a bequest
motive. Given that for reasonable levels of its strength, our results were not much a￿ected, we did not report
these results here.
23With increased correlation between stock and housing market risk, it becomes more di￿cult
to diversify these two risks. As a consequence, households are somewhat less likely to become
home owners and, conditional on becoming owners, the average fraction of wealth invested in
a privately owned home is smaller. At the same time, owners tend to increase their average
exposure to equity. That is, they substitute housing for stock market risk. Whereas with lower
correlation between stock and housing market risk a lower exposure to equity is su￿cient to
attain a reasonable level of diversi￿cation, an increased level of correlation requires a higher
exposure to equity to attain a reasonable level of diversi￿cation.
For renters that are less exposed to housing market risk, we primarily observe an increased
correlation between stock and housing market risk to a￿ect the households’ exposure to equity
and bonds. With increased correlation renters are a lot more exposed to equity. The higher
correlation between stock and housing market risk allows them to better hedge against rent price
risk by increasing their exposure to equity.
The columns marked HL = 0:5 show how a higher correlation between housing and labor
income risk a￿ect consumption, housing and investment policies for owners and renters. The
increased level of correlation increases the risk of simultaneous housing and labor market slumps
substantially, thereby making in particular leveraged housing investments more risky. As a con-
sequence, we observe a substantially lower homeownership rate than in our base case parameter
setting. Conditional on owning a home, the optimal average amount invested in it, is not much
a￿ected. However, we observe higher consumption rates and higher mortgage holdings at young
age. That is, at young age households are more willing to ￿nance part of their consumption by
using their home as a collateral.
For renters we observe e￿ects similar to those for owners. At young age, consumption rates
are higher and bond exposures are lower. In addition, renters increase their equity exposures
and the size of their home.
With increased correlation between labor and housing market risk, labor income provides
a better hedge against house price risk, which allows renters to choose larger home sizes. The
higher lease expenditures combined with the higher immediate consumption result in a lower
wealth level and thereby a higher labor income-wealth ratio. As labor income mimics the
payment stream from a coupon-bearing bond, our household optimally reduces his exposure
to bonds and increases his exposure to equity.
Our setting with lower half-life of housing market cycles ( = E[]+ = 0:2922) shows that
24the decreased long-run risk in housing markets results in a signi￿cantly higher homeownership
rate. At the same time, the average home size for owners decreases slightly, re￿ecting the on
average reduced importance of the desire to exploit housing market cycles. With on average
shorter housing market cycles, households are also more willing to stay owners for somewhat
less desirable housing risk premiums to avoid transaction costs. As these households tend to hold
smaller homes than households trying to exploit desirable housing risk premiums, the optimal
average home size decreases. Furthermore, households facing desirable housing risk premiums
may expect these premiums to revert faster to their mean than in our base case parameter
setting.
For renters, the exposure to stocks and bonds is most a￿ected by housing market cycles.
Essentially, the lower half-life of housing market cycles causes renters to decrease their exposure
to equity and increase their exposure to bonds. This re￿ects that households are more likely to
be renters in bad states of the housing market cycles. As a consequence, renters may expect
house prices to decrease. To increase chances of becoming owners in the future, these households
hold more bonds when housing market cycles are shorter.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new dynamic life cycle consumption, housing and portfolio prob-
lem when house prices are subject to housing market cycles and households receive unspanned
stochastic labor income. We further endogenize the decision whether to own or rent, include
transaction costs, and calibrate the house price process using Case-Shiller Home Price Index
data. Our regression analysis as well as the calibration of the model has shown that serial corre-
lation in annual returns of the Case-Shiller Home Price Index data from 1954 to 2009 is highly
signi￿cant (t-value 18.9) and that the regression explains more than 50% of the variability in
housing returns.
Since households in the U.S. have experienced this house price pattern for a long time during
their life cycles, it is likely that they have been trained to base their decisions also on the state of
the housing market cycle. Especially the experience that house prices have risen for a long time
made them aware that exploiting positive housing market cycles can be pro￿table. Given that
the housing investment is usually the largest investment of households, and a￿ects consumption
and portfolio choice decisions, it is important to understand how housing market cycles a￿ect
25household decision making.
While earlier studies showed that homeownership mainly serves the consumption and the
precautionary savings motive, our model additionally predicts a speculative demand for housing
investments. The key result is that households do not only base their decisions on labor-income,
wealth, and age, but also on the currently anticipated state of the housing market, i.e. the
level of the cyclical housing risk premium. Our life cycle utility optimization shows that the
cyclical housing risk premium is an important new state variable in life cycle consumption and
investment frameworks since optimal household decisions are highly sensitive to housing market
cycles. Commensurate to empirical data, our model predicts that in good states of housing
market cycles, households are more likely to be home owners, tend to live in larger homes,
and ￿nance their homes with higher leverage. With increasing house prices, households have
to purchase stocks to keep their portfolios diversi￿ed, which should help understanding the
positive empirically observed correlation between housing and stock returns. In states with
negative housing market cycles, all these e￿ects are reversed.
Our impulse response analysis predicts that signi￿cantly negative housing market shocks
have long lasting e￿ects not only on the housing investment itself, but also on consumption
and portfolio choice. Particularly, it predicts that a recovery from a housing market slump
may take several years. One reason is that households instantaneously try to manage risks by
selling their homes and deleverage their balance sheets (if they are not already forced to do so
by the minimum home-equity restriction) in times of bad housing market cycles so that there
is ongoing pressure on the housing market. The destruction of housing wealth implies second
round e￿ects such as reduced consumption levels and stock investments which puts further stress
on the economic situation.
Our welfare analysis shows that ignoring existing housing market cycles are seizable and
tend to exceed those from assuming cycles when they actually do not exist. Welfare losses for
the former type of household are especially severe if home owners underestimate the risk of an
extended housing market slump so that they stay in their home and su￿er potentially signi￿cant
losses in their housing wealth. Wrongly assuming cycles is mainly costly because moving costs
are incurred too often. A ￿nal robustness analysis con￿rms that our results are robust to various
assumptions.
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Figure 1: Historical evolution of stock and house prices: This ￿gure depicts the historical
annual real log-returns (upper graph) and index levels (lower graph) for the Case-Shiller house
price index and the S&P500 index from 1954 to 2009.
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Figure 2: Optimal policies renter: This ￿gure depicts the optimal policies as a function of
the cyclical housing risk premium H and the previous home size wH for households who have
been previously renting their home. Policy functions are presented for households aged 35 and
with labor income-wealth ratio of lw = 0:23. The surface with thick (thin) lines indicates the
area in which the households decides to rent (own) the home.
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Figure 3: Optimal policies owner: This ￿gure depicts the optimal policies as a function of
the cyclical housing risk premium H and the previous home size wH for households who have
been previously owning their home. Policy functions are presented for households aged 35 and
with labor income-wealth ratio of lw = 0:23. The surface with thick (thin) lines indicates the
area in which the households decides to rent (own) the home.
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Figure 4: Life cycle pro￿le: This ￿gure plots the evolution of the household’s average total
wealth, housing wealth, ￿nancial wealth, stock investments, and bond/mortgage holdings from
10,000 simulations on the optimal paths for our base case parameter setting.
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Figure 5: Evolution of consumption, investment, housing policies, and ownership
rate; base case parameter setting: This ￿gure shows average consumption, investment and
housing policies over the life cycle for households being owner (solid lines) or renter (dotted
lines) after trading at di￿erent ages. It further shows the evolution of the homeownership rate
from these simulations. All results are based on 10,000 simulations on the optimal paths. Except
for the homeownership rate, all results are expressed as fractions of wealth before trading and
consumption.
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Figure 6: Impulse response analysis, positive shock in cyclical housing risk premium:
This ￿gure shows how a positive persistent housing market shock (H+0:086) a￿ects the average
evolution of the household’s real consumption, investments and housing decisions over the life
cycle compared to our base case setting. It is distinguished between households initially being
owner or renter prior to trading at age 30 where the shock occurs. All results are based on
10,000 simulations on the respective optimal paths.
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Figure 7: Impulse response analysis, negative shock in cyclical housing risk premium:
This ￿gure shows how a negative persistent housing market shock (H 0:086) a￿ects the average
evolution of the household’s real consumption, investments and housing decisions over the life
cycle compared to our base case setting. It is distinguished between households initially being
owner or renter prior to trading at age 30 where the shock occurs. All results are based on
10,000 simulations on the respective optimal paths.
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Figure 8: Impact of housing market cycles: This ￿gure shows the average evolution of real
consumption C, investment, size of the home the household lives in (home size) and housing
wealth over the life cycle for both households trading in settings with housing market cycles
(solid lines) and without (dotted lines). It further compares homeownership rates for these two
settings. All results are based on 10,000 simulations on the respective optimal paths.
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Figure 9: Welfare costs: This ￿gure depicts the average welfare costs from 10,000 simulations
over the life cycle of 1) trading in a setting without housing market cycles following the alter-
native policy derived in a setting with such cycles (solid line ￿household assuming cycles￿) and
2) trading in a setting with housing market cycles following the alternative policy derived in a
setting without such cycles (dashed line ￿household ignoring cycles￿). Welfare costs are mea-
sured as fraction of present ￿nancial wealth, housing wealth and human capital (future income)
a household is willing to give up to avoid having to trade under the respective alternative policy.
40Parameter Estimate Standard error
 0.1478 (0.1444)
 0.8567 (0.1034)
log

Ht
Ht 1

0.0022 (0.0547)
  0.0022 (0.0340)
 0.0405 (0.0069)
H 0.9967 (0.0022)
H 0.0374 (0.0125)
 H -0.0169 (0.0340)
Table 1: Parameter estimates: This table reports our results from the estimation of the
house price process based on N = 55 annual observations with t = 1 year using the regression
log

Ht+1
Ht

= a+blog

Ht
Ht 1

. Due to the ￿nite sample, standard errors where computed using
Monte Carlo simulation.
41Description Parameter Value
Risk aversion 
 10
Housing preference   0.2
Utility discount factor 1= 0.96
Risk-free rate r ln(1:02)
Stock price volatility s 0.16
Risk premium stocks s 0.04
Long-term average risk premium housing H -0.0169
Instantaneous volatility house price H 0.1332
Volatility predictive signal  0.0405
Mean-reversion house premium  0.1478
Unconditional average log-return house  0.0022
Correlation stock, house price SH 0.22
Correlation stock, signal S 0.22
Correlation stock, labor SL 0.2
Correlation house price, signal H 0.9967
Correlation house price, labor HL 0.2
Correlation signal, labor L 0.2
Sensitivity signal  0.8567
Minimum equity requirement for house purchase Emin 20%
Renting costs rate mrent 7.0%
Maintenance costs rate mown 1.5%
Moving costs owner own 8.0%
Moving costs renter rent 1.0%
Replacement ratio Rretire 70%
Volatility labor income process L 10%
Table 2: Parameter values: This table reports our choice of base case parameter values.
42Base case SH = 0:5 HL = 0:5  = 0:2922
Age Owner Renter Owner Renter Owner Renter Owner Renter
25
Equity exposure Mean 0.25 0.47 0.30 0.49 0.23 0.43 0.27 0.45
Std 0.17 0.88 0.21 0.84 0.30 0.39 0.15 1.00
Consumption Mean 0.34 0.41 0.34 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.34 0.40
Std 0.20 0.77 0.22 0.71 0.46 0.42 0.17 0.90
Home size Mean 1.05 1.32 1.01 1.31 1.10 1.49 1.00 1.27
Std 0.59 2.49 0.62 2.26 1.24 1.36 0.48 2.85
Bonds Mean -0.68 0.02 -0.69 0.00 -0.78 0.00 -0.64 0.06
Std 0.40 0.06 0.44 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.33 0.14
Ownership rate 0.78 0.74 0.44 0.83
35
Equity exposure Mean 0.21 0.44 0.25 0.70 0.26 0.49 0.22 0.40
Std 0.12 0.98 0.18 1.39 0.21 0.68 0.09 1.23
Consumption Mean 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.19
Std 0.08 0.45 0.08 0.41 0.12 0.29 0.06 0.59
Home size Mean 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.64 0.58 0.68 0.54 0.60
Std 0.29 1.42 0.30 1.29 0.44 0.95 0.21 1.87
Bonds Mean 0.05 0.32 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.25 0.08 0.37
Std 0.13 0.71 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.13 1.14
Ownership rate 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.91
45
Equity exposure Mean 0.17 0.35 0.20 0.56 0.20 0.37 0.18 0.33
Std 0.09 0.86 0.14 1.24 0.14 0.61 0.06 1.42
Consumption Mean 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14
Std 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.04 0.59
Home size Mean 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.43
Std 0.22 1.04 0.23 0.96 0.30 0.72 0.14 1.86
Bonds Mean 0.27 0.48 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.46 0.29 0.50
Std 0.15 1.18 0.16 0.62 0.18 0.76 0.11 2.20
Ownership rate 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.95
55
Equity exposure Mean 0.15 0.31 0.16 0.46 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.29
Std 0.08 0.72 0.12 0.89 0.11 0.50 0.06 1.11
Consumption Mean 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12
Std 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.20 0.04 0.46
Home size Mean 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.39
Std 0.22 0.92 0.24 0.75 0.28 0.64 0.15 1.49
Bonds Mean 0.34 0.54 0.34 0.39 0.32 0.55 0.35 0.56
Std 0.18 1.26 0.20 0.78 0.22 0.90 0.13 2.12
Ownership rate 0.84 0.79 0.73 0.94
65
Equity exposure Mean 0.24 0.36 0.27 0.48 0.24 0.37 0.25 0.33
Std 0.14 0.75 0.22 0.64 0.14 0.70 0.11 0.93
Consumption Mean 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11
Std 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.32
Home size Mean 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.36
Std 0.20 0.81 0.27 0.53 0.22 0.73 0.16 1.04
Bonds Mean 0.26 0.50 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.49 0.24 0.53
Std 0.20 1.04 0.26 0.52 0.20 0.93 0.17 1.50
Ownership rate 0.81 0.64 0.78 0.89
75
Equity exposure Mean 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.31 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.24
Std 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.17
Consumption Mean 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.27
Std 0.51 0.17 0.92 0.11 0.50 0.16 0.44 0.19
Home size Mean 0.69 0.87 0.68 0.88 0.68 0.87 0.69 0.88
Std 1.24 0.56 2.07 0.39 1.22 0.55 1.05 0.64
Bonds Mean -0.10 0.43 -0.02 0.37 -0.09 0.43 -0.11 0.43
Std 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.32
Ownership rate 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.31
Table 3: Comparative static analysis: This table depicts the average evolution of the con-
sumption rate (Consumption), the equity exposure, the normalized home size (Home size), and
the bond exposure for both owners and renters. All results are expressed as fractions of wealth
before trading and consumption. The table further shows the probability that the household
owns a home. Results are shown for our base case parameter setting (Base case), a setting
where correlation between the stock and the house price process is set to 0.5 (SH = 0:5),
a setting where the correlation between innovations in the house price and the labor income
process is 0.5 (HL = 0:5), and a setting with shorter half-life for the housing market cycles
( = E[]+ = 0:2922). All results are based on 10,000 simulations on the respective optimal
paths.
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